University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1972

Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon
Howard Lesnick
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons

Repository Citation
Lesnick, Howard, "Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon" (1972). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 815.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/815

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

PREEMPTION RECONSIDERED: THE APPARENT
REAFFIRMATION OF GARN!ON
HOWARD LESNICK*
INTRODUCTION

It is a rare pleasure to be given the opportunity to participate in this
way in honoring Judge Hays. I will leave to others any expression of thoughts
regarding his overall contributions to the law, to the Columbia Law School
or, indeed, to the larger society ; for myself, I recall him as a wise and gentle
teacher, who contributed as much as anyone on the faculty to the reinforcement
of my desire to study, practice and teach law-in particular, labor law.
It is entirely appropriate to use this occasion to examine the continuing
evolution of the "preemption" doctrine. 1 Many who received their legal educa
tion at Columbia fifteen to twenty-five years ago will recall that one of
Professor Hays' most prescient insights was his early recognition that the
Taft-Hartley amendments 2 would have perhaps their greatest impact in a
totally unanticipated and, in a sense, perverse way. He referred to the 1947
Act as the Magna Carta of the labor movement; what he meant-if one can
credit a former student's recollection long after his class notes have been
forever mislaid-was that the statute would ultimately free unions from the
restrictions of state law and state courts, and that such a result would prove
far more significant than the limited strictures newly enacted into federal law.
I.

FRO:t>I Garmon TO Lockr1:dge

To a substantial degree such has indeed been the denouement, although
in a very episodic and uncertain way. To speak very generally, the period until
the 1959 decision in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon3 was one of
great vacillation, as the Court groped for an acceptable response. Some deci
sions suggested broad-ranging preemptive rationales ;4 others emphasized the
preclusive effect of federal law on state power, but on more limited grounds ;5
still others manifested a great reluctance to find in Taft-Hartley any meaning
ful interference with state regulation. 6 Garmon appeared to resolve this un* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This article is based on a paper
delivered at the Eighteenth Annual Institute on Labor Law of the Southwestern Legal
Foundation. Dallas, Texas, published in the Proceedings of the Institute by Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc.
1. The "preemption" doctrine deals with the effect of federal law on state regulation
of labor-management relations.
2. Pub. L. No. 80-1 0 1, 6 1 Stat. 1 36 ( 1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1 4 1 et seq.
(1 970)).
3. 359 U.S. 236 (1 959).
4. E.g., Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 ( 1 953).
5. E.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1 955).
6. E.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 6 1 7 ( 1958) ' Inter
national Union, UA \V v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 ( 1 949).
·
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certainty.Arising on review of a state court judgment against minority-union
picketing for recognition and a closed shop, the decision reflected a commit
ment-albeit by a bare maj ority of the j ustices-to an expansive concept of
preemption. Specifically, it set to rest the contention that state law could
supplement federal remedies and strongly espoused what one might call a
"primary jurisdiction" rationale for preemption:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a
State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, clue
regard for the federal enactment requires that state j urisdiction must
yield . ... When an activity is arguably subj ect to § 7 or § 8 of the
Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclu
sive competence of the National Labor Relations Board ....7
The decade following witnessed a consolidation of the mandate of Garmon
and an articulation of the scope and limits of its principles, but the sense of
vacillation persisted. There was strong fidelity to its core concept of discour
aging state regulation of strikes, boycotts and picketing,8 and state court
resistance to preemption appeared to ease, thereby lessening the need for active
Supreme Court involvement in the area.9 At the same time, a series of new
issues arose which the Court consistently distinguished from Garmon ;10
some of these issues were important, others rather trivial, but the impression
grew that the Court was retrenching. This feeling was crystallized in 1970
by the call, from within the Court, for reexamination and narrowing of the
preemption doctrine.U With a substantial minority of the justices j oining in
7. 359 U.S. at 244-45.
8. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1 964); Marine Eng'rs
Benevolent Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962) ; cf. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
9. A contributing factor was doubtless the enactment, in the same year as the Garmon
decision, of new federal legislative restrictions on organizational picketing and secondary
boycotts. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
(1970) . While the reception accorded these provisions by the Board and the courts has
generated continuing controversy, it is clear that they provide some significant employer
access to a federal remedy for practices that formerly could be proceeded against only
in state courts.
10. E.g., Vaca v.Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (fair representation); Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (defamation); Carey v. Westing
house Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (arbitration); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,
371 U.S. 195 (1962) (breach of contract).
11. Taggart v.Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970), involved the picketing of a
retail store on a portion of sidewalk that was privately owned. The Court did not de
cide the case (raising preemption and First Amendment issues) on the merits. In con
curring in the dismissal of the writ of certiorari, Chief Justice Burger volunteered his
view that the Court should assimilate "trespass" to the body of decisions allowing
states to regulate violence and defamation. I d. at 228. In International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), the Court routinely
reversed a state-court injunction against the picketing of a foreign-flag ship which used
American longshoremen to load the vessel. Justice 'vVhite with the concurrence of
Justices Stewart and Burger, urged that state power shoul�l not be preempted simply
because the uni?n conduct was "arguably" protected; the state court should be pre
cluded from actmg only if it (or the Supreme Court on direct review) would hold that
the action c omplained of was "actually" protected. Id. at 202.
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the expression of skeptical views, real doubts >vere generated whether Garmon
would survive the imminent reexamination.
In Amalgmnated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees v. Lockridge,l2 pre
emption made a goal-line stand, and held: Garmon lives (four justices dis
senting) ! Lockridge was one of a number of Greyhound drivers, employed
under a union-security agreement, who revoked their check-off authorizations
and promptly forgot to pay their union dues directly at the first of the month.
The union constitution was a curious one. It provided that a member lost his
good standing but remained a member if the clues were not paid by the
fifteenth of the month in which they were due; and that he was deemed
suspended from membership if they were not paid by the end of the next
month. But it also stipulated that, if an applicable collective bargaining agree
ment required the maintenance of membership in good standing as a condition
of employment, a member might be suspended from membership (and dis
charged) after only one month. The Greyhound agreement simply required
continued membership, rather than membership in good standing; neverthe
less, the union treasurer erroneously notified Lockridge of his suspension
from membership when he was in arrears one day beyond one month, simul
taneously advising Greyhound of the action and requesting that Lockridge
be discharged. Lockridge was away on vacation when the suspension notice
arrived, and his wife immediately tendered a check for two months' dues,
which was refused. Greyhound removed Lockridge from the payroll promptly
after receiving the notice of suspension.
No labor lawyer would feel uncomfortable arguing in support of a charge
of unfair labor practices on these facts. Discharge could lawfully be sought
or implemented under the National Labor Relations Act only if Lockridge's
membership was terminated because of his "failure to tender the periodic
dues ... uniformly required as a condition of ...retaining membership ...."13
But Lockridge had not yet failed to tender the dues required to retain member
ship, and had simply lost his good standing. Moreover, the circumstances
reek of suspicion that the delinquency was merely a pretext, that "the Union
insisted on what it thought was a technically valid position because it was
piqued by Lockridge's obtaining his release from the checkof£."14 Nevertheless,
Lockridge did not file charges with the NLRB. Perhaps his failure to do so
resulted from the Board's dismissal of charges filed by a fellow employee
similarly suspended from membership and discharged. The regional director
had there refused to issue a complaint, giving only the boilerplate ground
that "there is insufficient evidence of violations . . . . "15 Nearly a year after

12. 403 U.S. 274 ( 1971).
1 3. 29 U.S.C. § ISS(b) (2) (1970). See id. at§ ISS(a) (3 ) .
14. 403 U.S. at 280. The Court so characterized the "likely" facts' in the absence of
formal findings by the trial court.
15. Id. at 280 n.3. Review by the General Counsel was not sought.
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the regional director's refusal, Lockridge brought suit against the union in
state court and recovered a judgment reinstating him to membership and
awarding him over $30,000 in lost pay.
Speaking for a five-man maj ority, Justice Harlan characterized the case
as a "routine and simple"16 one for preemption; but, recognizing the "under
standable confusion, perhaps in a measure attributable to the previous opinions
of this Court, ... over the jurisprudential bases"17 of Garmon, he thought it
appropriate to write at length. Rather than attempt here a summary of the
analyses of Court and dissenters, I prefer to draw on them as appropriate i n
the context o f the thesis that I would like t o present: Lockridge makes clear
that the time has long since come to eschew entirely the traditional "primary
jurisdiction" rationale implicit in the "protected or prohibited" aphorism which
has served as the guiding wisdom in the area.
II.

THE "PRIMARY JuRISDICTION" RATIONALE

The traditional approach may be stated in these terms: ( 1) If conduct
is protected under section 718 or prohibited under section 8,19 there is pre
emption because federal law regulates the conduct and concurrent state regula
tion is not permitted; (2) if the conduct is neither protected nor prohibited,
there is no preemption because the conduct is not federally regulated ; but ( 3)
if the conduct is "arguably" protected or prohibited, there is preemption
because only the NLRB (subject to appellate review) can adjudicate questions
under the Act, and thus determine whether the conduct in fact falls within
proposition 1 or proposition 2. 2 0
A.

({Arguably Protected}): The Irrelevance of Section 7

Virtually every aspect of this rubric is analytically disquieting, doctrinally
misleading, or both. Thus-to begin with the "arguably protected" category
on what basis can the law hold not only that federal rights may be asserted
defensively in a suit based on state law, 2 1 but that the state court may not
then decide whether there is merit in the assertion? It has always seemed
fairly evident to me (and, I would guess, to most labor lawyers ) that the real
reason for this position is nothing more nor less than a pervasive mistrust of
state court fact-finding and law-finding processes in labor cases. Such cynicism
would be well warranted by history, but judicial acceptance of its implications
would be rather startling, and one would not expect to find explicit Supreme
Court ratio in support of such a position.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 282.
Id. at 285.
29 u.s.c.§ 157 (1970).
29 u.s.c. § 158 (1970).
See, e.g., C. MoRRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 788-93 (1971).
All agree that if union conduct is "actually protected," state law may not make

it actionable.
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One can, of course, shift the focus from the failings of state law in pro
tecting federal rights to the inadequacies of Supreme Court certiorari review
to meet the problem. From that perspective our traditional notion that the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court safeguards the vindication of
federal law in state courts is perceived to fail us. Justice Harlan said as much
in Lockridge:
Nor can we proceed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether
each particular final judicial pronouncement does, or might reason
ably be thought to, conflict in some relevant manner with federal
labor policy. This Court is ill-equipped to play such a role and the
federal system dictates that this problem be solved with a rule capable
of relatively easy application, so that lower courts may largely police
themselves in this regard. 22
But surely more needs to be said. In other instances in which it is thought
appropriate to assure a litigant a federal forum for the trial of issues of federal
law-the removal jurisdiction of the district courts is probably the most
common example23-a federal forum is in fact provided. But a union seeking
to abort a state-court proceeding on the ground that federal law "arguably"
protects its conduct need not invoke a federal tribunal, whether by removal or
otherwise. Indeed, the employer may not, on his own initiative, present to
federal adjudicators his contention that the conduct is not protected, for the
N LRB (the sole initial expositor of rights under the Act) has no substantive
declaratory-judgment jurisdiction. 24 The question whether conduct is unpro
tected is faced by the Board only in proceedings against employers, when an
allegedly illegal discharge is sought to be justified on the ground that the con
duct for which the employee was discharged was not protected under section 7.
In my judgment, such difficulties bespeak the irrelevance of section 7,
and the concept of protected and unprotected conduct, to the preemption prob
lem. To say that an act is protected under section 7 is to say that an employer
commits an unfair labor practice by punishing or threatening an employee for
engaging in such an act. The issue cannot even be framed in most cases of
picketing-as in organizing situations or many varieties of secondary boy
cotts-where "strangers" to the employer are involved. Of course the Court
has held since Hill v. Florida25 that the rights conferred by section 7 mav be
asserted against state regulation as well as against employer discipline. But
(to take the setting of Ariadne as an example) 26 were a state to provide by
statute that no union may picket a foreign-flag ship in any port within the
22. 403 U.S. at 289-90. See also B rotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Ter
minal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 390-93 ( 1969).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 ( 1 970).
24. Justice 'White relied on this point to support his contention that there should
be no preemption simply on the claim of "arguably protected." See his dissent in Lock
ridge. 403 U.S. at 325-32. and his concurring opinion in Ariadne, 397 U.S. at 20 1 .
25. 325 U.S. 538 ( 1 945).
26. See note 11 supra.
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state, the Court would strike it down-without any talk about exclusive NLRB
competence, impracticability of Supreme Court review, or conduct "arguably
protected"-on the ground that, although the state court had jurisdiction over
a case based on the violation of state law, that law was an "actual," not an
"arguable," infringement of federally protected rights.27 Such a case, in which
the Court decides what is federally protected, is a far cry from the use of
"arguably protected" to exclude the plaintiff from any forum in which he may
seek to establish that the conduct is in fact not protected. If an acceptable basis
for so excluding him is to be found, it would be better to search for it un
encumbered by the deceptive appeal of resort to section 7.
B.

((Prohibited}} or ((Arguably Prohibited}}: The Relevance of Section 8

The remaining aspects of the traditional primary-jurisdiction aphorism
are no more compelling on initial critical examination than the "arguably pro
tected" element. As to "prohibited" acts, it is of course clear that only the
NLRB may enforce the unfair practice provisions of the Act. A state-court
plaintiff, however, relies on a state-created cause of action, and it is not imme
diately apparent why the existence of a similar wrong under section 8 of the
federal law should displace state law. To speak of the "arguably prohibited"
quality of conduct as grounds for preemption implies that, if the challenged
acts are "actually" prohibited, they may be redressed by the NLRB, and that
therefore plaintiff must seek adjudication there. This implication leads to the
absurd spectacle of a union defendant, charged with violations of state law,
defending on the ground that it has violated federal law as well, while the
employer rebuts by earnestly asserting the complete propriety of the union's
acts under federal standards. Furthermore, the obverse of the implication is
false, for-to come to the final theme in the primary-jurisdiction rubric-the
notion that there is no preemption if unprotected conduct is also not pro
hibited is simply not the law. The decision in Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton28
is squarely dispositive of the point that the inquiry is not so easily set to rest:
[E] ven though it may be assumed that at least some of the secondary
activity here involved was neither protected nor prohibited, it is still
necessary to determine whether by enacting § 303, "Congress occu
pied this field and closed it to state regulation." . . . The basic
question . . . is whether "in a case such as this, incompatible doctrines
of local law must give way to principles of federal labor law. . . . "
The answer to that question ultimately depends upon whether the
application of state law in this kind of case would operate to frustrate
the purpose of the federal legislation.29
27. E.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St reet Employees, Div. 1287 v. Missouri, 374 U.S.
74 (1 963); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, Div. 998 v. \Visconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 ( 195 1) ; International Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S.
454 (1950).
28. 377 U. S. 252 ( 1964).
29. Id. at 258. See also Hanna Mining Co.v. Marine Eng'rs Benevolent Ass'n, 382
U. S. 181, 187, 189 (1 965).
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I believe, however, that the instant questions-why state power should be
preempted where conduct is prohibited or is arguably prohibited-are per
tinent ones.I will attempt in what follows to suggest the contours of answers
that, in my judgment, do lend strong support to what the Supreme Court has
done, and much of what it has said, in this field.
1. Federally Prohibited Conduct. It is difficult to find non-conclusory,
non-metaphoric discussions of the reasons that the existence of section 8 viola
tions-redressable, to be sure, only through federal administrative proceedings
-should displace state-created causes of action embodying identical condemna
tions. Justice Jackson spoke to this issue in an oft-cited passage in Garner v.
Teamsters Local 776:

Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to
be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the
parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application
of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and pre
scribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice,
and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final
administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized
administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to ob
tain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these
diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local proce
dures and attitudes toward labor controversies.. . . A multiplicity of
tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce
incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of
substantive law. The same reasoning which prohibits federal courts
from intervening in such cases, except by way of review or on appli
cation of the federal Board, precludes state courts from doing so.3 0
It is worth noting that Justice Jackson was addressing himself to the question
why state courts were not given concurrent jurisdiction to apply federal law,
thus assuming, presumably, that the underlying state law was displaced by
the mere enactment of federal substantive regulation. In Lockridge, Mr.
Justice Harlan, after quoting from this portion of Garner, added his own
perceptions:
Conflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Con
gress erected as conflict in overt policy. As the passage from Garner
indicates, in matters of dispute concerning labor relations a simple
recitation of the formally prescribed rights and duties of the parties
constitutes an inadequate description of the actual process for settle
ment Congress has provided. The technique of administration and the
range and nature of those remedies that are and are not available
is a fundamental part and parcel of the operative legal system estab
lished bv the National Labor Relations Act....The rationale for
preemption, then, rests in large measure upon our determination that
'.vhen it set clown a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to
do more than simply to alter the then prevailing substantive law.
It sought as well to restructure fundamentally the processes for ef30. 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
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fectuating that policy, deliberately placing the responsibility for apply
ing and developing this comprehensive legal system in the hands of
an expert administrative body rather than the federalized judicial
system. Thus, that a local court, while adjudicating a labor dispute
also within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, may purport to apply legal
rules identical to those prescribed in the federal Act or may eschew
the authority to define or apply principles specifically developed to
regulate labor relations does not mean that all relevant potential for
debilitating conflict is absent.31
Justice Harlan's analysis leads one to recall more precisely what Congress
did when it defined specific conduct as an unfair labor practice. It "outlawed"
the conduct, to be sure, and authorized the Board to "prevent any person"
from engaging in it ;32 in so doing, however, it hedged that substantive judg
ment with many critical procedural decisions. Thus, there is no private right
of action whatever and aggrieved individuals must bear the burden of per
suading a public official to seek redress ;33 action must be sought within the
unusually short six-months limitation period ;34 the nagging problem of equi
table relief pendente lite is made the subject of specific, complex regulation ;35
fact-finding is placed in the hands of an administrative body, subject to limited
judicial review ;36 and remedies, for the most part equitable and prospective,
are subject to the broad remedial discretion given the NLRB under

a

vague statutory criterion.37 It was under these conditions that Congress pro
- nd Lockridge p���ages suggest,
scribed certain practices and if, �s the-·Garne;::a
they were deemed of the essence of the legislative decision to act, the assump
tion is that all enforcement machinery should function in full conformity to
the regime constructed by Congress. State law, then, can never be said merely
to parallel the federal act, for the enforcement apparatus is by hypothesis
exclusively federal.
The evolution of the Court's response to the question of the availability
of state remedies for conduct violative of both federal and state law illustrates
this point. In United Constr. Workers

national Ass'n of Machinists

v.

Laburnum Constr. Corp. ,38 Inter
Gonzales39 and International Union, UAW v.
v.

31.403 U.S. at 287-88 (footnote omitted).
32."The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice ...." 29 U.S. C.§ 160(a) (1970).
33.29 U. S.C. §§153(c), 160 (1970).
34.29 u.s.c. § 160(b) (1970).
35. Section 10(!) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 160(!) (1970), does not permit private
party access to preliminary injunctive relief, but requires the General Counsel of the
Board to seek preliminary relief once he has decided to proceed with the case. At the
same time, the ultimate discretion of the district court to make such orders respecting
the grant or denial of injunctive relief "as it deems just and proper"
' with procedural
safeguards relating to notice and hearing, is preserved. Id.
36.29 U.S. C. §§ 160(c), (e), (f) (1970).
37. 29 U. S. C. § 160(c) (1970). (The Board may require the respondent to take "such
affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of this Act .... ).
38. 347 u.s. 656 (1954).
39.356 u.s. 617 (1958).
"
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Russell,40 the Court permitted the recovery of both compensatory and punitive
damages for conduct actionable under state law. The fact that the conduct
violated the NLRA was deemed evidence "of congressional disapproval . . . in
consistent with immunization from liability for damages . . . . ;"41 the Court
thus found no indication that the discretion granted the NLRB to award
back pay was intended "to constitute an exclusive pattern of money damages
for private injuries."42 Instead, the Justices characterized lost pay (the limit of
financial recompense obtainable from the Board) as merely "partial relief",
which the states could supplement. 34
Chief Justice Warren strongly dissented from this view of the effect of
federal law:
Even if we assume that the Board had no authority to award respon
dent back pay in the circumstances of this case, the existence of such
a gap in the remedial scheme of federal legislation is no license for
the States to fashion correctives .. . . The Federal Act represents an
attempt to balance the competing interests of employee, union and
management. By providing additional remedies the States may upset
that balance as effectively as by frustrating or duplicating existing
ones. 44
It is the Chief Justice's analysis that has prevailed. The unavailability of par
ticular remedial measures is now perceived, not as a gap or failing which a
state may fill or redress, but as a conscious congressional judgment, creating
a balance which state "supplementation" may not upset. 45 Thus the emphasis,
in examining the availability of a given remedy from the Board as a ground
for preemption, is on the likelihood, not that the NLRB can provide the
remedy in question, but that it cannot.
2. A rguably Prohibited Conduct. As the foregoing strongly suggests, the
most illuminating area of inquiry is "arguably prohibited" conduct. Here too,
my contention is that preemption does not flow from the possibility that con
duct arguably prohibited may be actually prohibited-and therefore actionable
before the Board, and only before the Board; the case for preemption rests
rather on the prospect that arguably prohibited conduct may be actually not
prohibited-and therefore intended to be free of all legal restraint, state as
well as federal.
It is curious that this point has been so dimly perceived, for the Court
40. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
41. 347 U.S.at 666-67.
42. 356 U.S. at 645.
43. 356 U.S. at 621.
44. International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S.at 650.See also nis dissent in
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 623 (1958).
45. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 288-89
n.5 (1971), specifically condemning "disparities in the reactions of the States to �nlavvful
union behavior."; Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1964).
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had said as much as early as 1953. The Garner decision prohibited a state
from enjoining minority-union picketing for recognition, on the ground that
federal unfair labor practices dealt-albeit only partially-with union pressure
on the self-organizational rights of employees. Justice Jackson's analysis bears
recalling:
The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified
types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be
free of other methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the
national Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all
picketing but only that ascertained by its prescribed processes to fall
within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the
public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the weapon of
picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat de
signed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy
as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by
methods which the federal Act prohibits.46
This approach finds in the failure of Congress to prohibit certain conduct a
warrant for the negative inference that it was deemed proper, indeed desirable
-at least, desirable to be left for the free play of contending economic forces.
Thus, the state is not merely filling a gap when it outlaws what federal law
fails to outlaw; it is denying one party to an economic contest a weapon that
Congress meant him to have available.
3. The "Negative Inference'' Rationale. One can see how such an inter
pretation, combined with similar views regarding the enforcement and reme
dial design of the Act,47 might lead one to characterize the Taft-Hartley
amendments as labor's Magna Carta, for the significance of the restraints
actually embodied in the section 8(b) prohibitions pales when set in the con
text of a perceived legislative commitment to the free use of economic weapons
not actually proscribed. It is not surprising, recalling the nation's contem
poraneous perception of Taft-Hartley, that, despite Garner, the period should
have been marked by quite different judicial interpretations as well.48 Never46. 346 U.S. at 499-500.

47. See text accompanying notes 30-45 supra.
48. Consider, in addition to the "remedies" decisions previously discussed, see text
accompanying notes 38-43 supra, two cases decided in 1949. In International Union, UAW
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 ( 1949) (Briggs-Stratton), the
Court upheld state power to enjoin intermittent work stoppages. This decision is the
origin of the principle that, where conduct is "neither protected nor prohibited," there is
a regulatory void which the state may fill. "This conduct is governable by the State
or it is entirely ungoverned." Id. at 254. However, on the "not prohibited" side, the
Court did not simply note that the unfair labor practice provisions failed to cover the
challenged conduct, but made the point that there was no provision that seemed even to
speak to the problem. "(N]o proceeding is authorized by which the Federal Board may
deal with it in any manner." ld. at 253. This decision predated the attempt by the
Eisenhower Board to find such a provision in section 8 (b) (3), requiring unions to bargain
in good faith, see NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) ; today
the case would doubtless be viewed differently. Cf. note 53 infra.
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.' 336 U.S.
301 (1949) , upheld a state law permitting union-security agreements only by a two-thirds
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theless, it has become increasingly clear that the failure of section 8 to outlaw
certain conduct raises the question whether Congress thereby legitimized it,
and that the answer to the question will often be in the affirmative. Again the
J.11art on decision is squarely on point. Ohio law was held precluded from
interfering with noncoercive appeals to secondary employers to boycott a
struck company:
In this case, the petitioner's request to Launder's management to
cease doing business with the respondent was not proscribed by the
Act." [A] union is free to approach an employer to persuade him
to engage in a boycot, so long as it refrains from the specifically pro
hibited means of coercion through inducement of employees." Car
penters Local 1976 v. Labor Board, . . . 357 U.S. at 99. This weapon
of self-help, permitted by federal law, formed an integral part of the
petitioner's effort to achieve its bargaining goals during negotiations
with the respondent. Allowing its use is a part of the balance struck
by Congress between the conflicting interests of the union, the em
ployees, the employer and the community.... If the Ohio law of
secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe the same type of con
duct which Congress focused upon but did not proscribe when it
enacted § 303, the inevitable result would be to frustrate the con
gressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help available,
and to upset the balance of povver between labor and management
expressed in our national labor policy.49
in effect reaffirms this view,50 which is plainly consonant with
the realities of the legislative process as it has dealt with the economic weapons
available to labor and management. Consider, for example, the reach of
section 8 (b) ( 4) 51 as affected by the primary-secondary dichotomy or the
consumer-publicity proviso; or the status under section 8(b) (7) 52 of pre
election picketing during an organizational campaign which the employer is
vigorously (perhaps unlawfully) opposing: Is it not apparent that, if one
Lockridge

vote of the employees. Justice Frankfurter, for the Court, squarely rejected the nega
tive-inference approach:
It is argued, therefore, that a State cannot forbid what § 8(3) affirmatively per
mits. The short answer is that § 8 ( 3) merely disclaims a national policy hostile
to the closed shop or other forms of union-security agreement.
I d. at 307. He relied on specific legislative history from the 1935 debates to support his
view, and it is important to recall that he was here holding only that the Wagner Act
contained no preclusion of state regulation of union security. Federal restrictions on
union-security agreements had been placed in the 1935 Act only to restrain employers
from preempting genuinely independent organizing efforts; the legislature had not faced
at all their propriety as a union weapon. The Taft-Hartley amendments would have
changed all that, and given rise to a strong "negative inference" argument, were it not
for the express disclaimer in section 14 (b). See 336 U.S. at 313-14; note 50 infra.
49. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. at 259-60. See also the Court's formula
tion of the issue in Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs Benevolent Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181,
189 (1965), where, however, the answer was different, see text accompanying notes 5659 infra.
50. Indeed its holding amounts to a decision sub silentio that Algoma Plywood
discussed in note 48 snpra, lost its validity with the passage of the Taft-Hartley amend�
ments, except in "right to work" states under section 14 (b).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(4) (1970).
52. 29 u.s.c. § 158(7) (1970).
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concludes that certain conduct does not violate either of those incredibly
complex provisions, he is not asserting that it is "unregulated" by federal
law? The premise is rather that Congress judged whether the conduct \vas
illicit or legitimate, and that "legitimate" connotes, not simply that federal
law is neutral, but that the conduct is to be assimilated to the large residual
area in which a regime of free collective bargaining-"economic warfare,"
if you prefer-is thought to be the course of regulatory wisdom.53
By this analysis, a negative inference, that conduct not prohibited is
"designed to be free," would ordinarily be warranted. The crucial issue is
whether it is not warranted in any particular instance. Section 14(b) embodies
the unique case of specific legislative rejection of the negative inference.
In Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn,54 the Court upheld a state's
power to apply its own law against union-security agreements lawful under
federal law, and to enforce state law in state court, despite some textual
warrant for reading the provision to make enforcement of a union-shop
agreement in a "right to work" state a federal unfair labor practice.55 Another
exception was dealt with in Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs Benevolent
Ass'n,56 which upheld the right of a state court to enjoin recognition picketing
by a minority union comprised of supervisory workers. Supervisors are ex53. It is in this sense that one may speak of the use of economic weapons as "pro
tected" under the federal Act. However, the thought meant to be conveyed is importantly
different from the connotation which "protected activity" has under section 7. See text
accompanying notes 25-27 supra. It is misleading, as well as conclusory, to employ the
term in determining the effect of federal law on state restrictions of union or employer
economic weapons.
The analysis set forth in the text is intellectually nourished by those decisions which,
in construing the unfair-labor-practice provisions of the Act, emphasized the national
commitment to free collective bargaining and the legislative reluctance to entrust to the
Board or the courts wide discretion to judge the desirability of particular labor-manage
ment economic weapons. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-18
(1965) (lockouts); Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676 (1961) (hiring
halls); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 284 (1960) (recognition picket
ing); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 500 (1960) (bargaining
tactics); Local 1976, Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958) (hot cargo agree
ments); cf. Local 1424, Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 428-29 (1960) (statute of
limitations). These decisions provided the perspective from which cases such as Morion
drew preemptive inferences from congressional "failure" to prohibit. See also Justice
Harlan's analysis in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
u.s. 369 (1969).
54. 375 u.s. 96 (1963).
55.See id. at 103. Section 14(b) states that the Act (referring in particular to the
proviso to section 8(a) (3)) shall not "be construed as authorizing" enforcement of
union-security agreements contrary to state law. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Such en
forcement would be in violation of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2), on which a complaint
to the NLRB could be based.
The Lockridge opinions do not discuss section 14 (b), presumably because Idaho is
not a "right to work" state. But the statute does not require a formal state enactment
prohibiting union security, wholly or subject to certain conditions; it forbids broadly the
"execution or application" of union-security agreements where prohibited by state law.
See Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. \Visconsin Employment Relations Bd. 336 U. S.
301, 314 (1949). One must inquire why the rule of decision applied by the Id�ho courts
in Lockridge was not deemed such a prohibition. Is "state law" to be read to exclude
judge-made law? Is there ground for questioning, and is it relevant to question' the prior
existence of the "law" invoked in the Lockridge litigation?
56.382 u.s. 181 ( 1965).
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eluded from the statutory definition of "employee," and as a result of the
interlacing definitions their union is not a "labor organization" within the
meaning of the Act ; accordingly, what would otherwise clearly violate section
8(b) (7) is "not prohibited" by the NLRA.57 " [T] he question arises,"
Justice Harlan noted for the Court, "whether Congress nonetheless desired
that in their peaceful facets these efforts remain free from state regulation
as well as Board authority" ;58 the Court saw in the legislative history sur
rounding the decision to exempt supervisors from employee status no warrant
for answering the question in the affirmative.59 The case is significant, not so
much for the particularities of that answer, as for the process of decision
it illustrates and the consistency of its basic approach with that suggested in
Morton.60
III.
A.

CON CLUSIONS

The "Exceptions" to Preemption

Justice White, dissenting in Lockridge, approached the preemption ques
tion conscious, not only of the difficulties with the "primary jurisdiction"
rationale of Garmon,6 1 but also of the many circumstances in which the
Court had permitted state law to operate in the field. "To summarize," he
observed, "the 'rule' of uniformity that the Court invokes today is at best a
tattered one, and at worst little more than a myth. " 62 In support, he adduced
the following: enforcement of collective bargaining agreements under section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 63 whether in a j udicial or
arbitral forum ; the duty of fair representation, where relevant to enforcement
of employee's claim under the collective agreement ; damage actions for un
lawful secondary boycotts under section 303 ;64 violence ; defamation ; and
union internal affairs.
It is of interest to note that most of these "exceptions" are limitations
on the pervasive exclusivity of NLRB jurisdiction, but deal with situations
nonetheless governed by federal law ; thus, the inconsistency is substantially
57. See 29 U.S.C. § § 152(3), (5) ( 1970) ; Marine Eng'rs Benevolent Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 ( 1 962).
58. 382 U.S. at 1 89.
59. I d. at 1 89-90.
60. I do not believe that Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S.
53 ( 1966), partially upholding state defamation suits, is inconsistent with this analysis
although the tone of the opinion is somewhat so. "The malicious publication of l i belou �
statements does not in and of itself constitute an unfair labor practice " id. at 63' not
'
because Congress deemed such conduct legitimate, but because it sought to regulate only
coercive or misleading speech, and was not addressing itself to inj ury to reputation. "The
injury that [ a defamatory) statement might cause to an individual's reputation-whether
he be an employer or union official-has no relevance to the Board's function." Id. See
note 66 infra.
61. See note 24 supra.
62. 403 U.S. at 318.
63. 29 u.s.c. § 1 85 ( 1970) .
64. 29 u.s.c. § 1 87 (1 970).
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lessened if one discards, as I have suggested, the primary j urisdiction of the
Board as the basis for preemption. I do not mean to indicate that none of these
areas would profit from judicial or legislative reexamination, 65 but they hardly
" 66
render the concerns and premises of Garmon and Lockridge a "myth.
B. The Need for Improved Access to Federal Re1nedies
vVhen all is said and done, however, one cannot leave an approvmg
discussion of Lockridge without acknowledging that an injustice was done ;
Lockridge and others were discharged, in all probability unlawfully, and
received neither recovery nor a genuine opportunity to prove their case. The
65. Section 301 is the most complex area, but in retrospect one can hardly assert with
confidence that an alternate road to that marked out by the Court would have been
preferable. Congress itself made the conscious decision to entrust enforcement of the
agreement to the courts rather than to the Board, and the Supreme Court surely could
not have been expected to hold that federal j udicial j urisdiction is exclusive. Charles
Dmvd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 ( 1 962 ) . It has wholly federalized the governing
substantive law, Teamsters Local 1 74 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 ( 1 962 ) , and its
decision not to hold j udicial j urisdiction preempted by the existence of potential unfair
labor practices in the facts of a breach-of-contract claim, Smith v. Evening News Ass 'n,
37 1 U.S. 195 ( 1 962 ) , seems a wise one. Surely it creates problems in some circumstances,
but the other view would hardly have done less, and in any event the issue is quite distinct
from that involved in the typical preemption case such as Garm on. There may be stronger
grounds for questioning the wisdom of Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 1 7 1 ( 1 967 ) , which eagerly
authorized section 30 1 suits against unions-as well as against employers-for breach of
the duty of fair representation when a claim based on the agreement is involved. But the
area is fiendishly complex, and no course would have eliminated overlapping forums and
elusive distinctions.
I believe, however, that the totally free rein given state courts to deal with "violence"
will not bear Supreme Court reexamination. As Justice White accurately observed in
Lo ckridge :

[ I ] t is entirely possible that some States will require a greater showing of violence
than others before awarding damages, so that behavior which violently seeks to
coerce union membership will be prohibited i n one State and allowed i n another.
But the interest in uniformity is subordinated to the larger interests that p ersons
inj ured by such violence be preserved whatever remedies state law may authorize.
403 U. S. at 3 1 8. It seems clear that federal law should speak at least minimally to three
problems : the line between peaceful and violent conduct, as to which wide variations in
local. treatment are common ; basic procedural safeguards in the fact-finding process, par
ticularly in inj unction cases ; and some guidelines or outer limits on the availability of
punitive damages. Under any analysis, it is impossible to j ustify the total abdication of
any federal supervision over these matters (compare the treatment of defamation, note 66
infra), but the Supreme Court has shown no eagerness to speak to the question. Taggart
v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 ( 1 970 ) , see note 1 1 sup ra, raised some aspects of it,
but the Court declined to decide the merits of the case.
66. The area of defamation deserves a word. Because the Court split so closely and
so sharply on whether to preclude entirely state-created defamation suits, Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers, Local 1 1 4, 383 U.S. 53 ( 1966 ) , it is easy to read more than i s
warranted into the majority's refusal t o g o s o far. Linn most assuredly did not hold that
state defamation actions were "exceptions" to preemption, and therefore not matters of
federal concern. The Court held that federal law, derived from a concern "that the
recognition of legitimate state interests . . . not interfere with effective administration of
national labor policy . . . " id. at 64, set the outer limits of permissible resort to state
defamation law. Two specific federal conditions-proof of malice in fact and of actual
damages-were announced ; a third, restriction of the types of defamation that could be
made actionable, was rej ected on policy grounds ; and the Court specifically reserved the
question whether experience might warrant further limitation. Again' the case reflects
lessened concern over the primary j urisdiction of the NLRB, but as a substantive matter
the inroads made by Linn are quite substantial ; indeed, it would be a very rare case which
would be worth litigating under it.
,
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weaknesses 1 1 1 our legal regime that the case exposes are not, however, in
the preemption of state law ; with all respect, I have great difficulty perceiving
the relevance of much of Justice ·white's discussion to the case there at
hand.67 The weaknesses involve rather the adequacy of access to the federal
enforcement machinery, the exclusivity of which was so forcibly brought home
to Lockridge.
The statute of limitations is unconscionably short as applied to cases
where neither union nor employer is likely to file a charge.68 It should be
changed, but even an academic recognizes the futility of further discussion
of that issue. However, the "law" governing regional-director and general
counsel decisions not to issue a complaint is another matter. The point is
not that there is no judicial review of refusals to proceed, for to grant review
would open the courts to a deluge of unnecessary litigation.69 What is
needlessly unjust is the almost total failure to provide basic procedural
safeguards to assist the charging party-or one not represented by a labor
lawyer who "knows the ropes"-in making his case, and to regularize and
channel the discretion of the regional director and general counsel. Surely
the Board can provide some definition of the hearing (or conference ) rights
to be accorded charging parties, and require some genuinely meaningful dis
closure of the reasons supporting a refusal to proceed-not the form recitals
so often encountered70-by the regional director or (were protection prior to
his decision deemed warranted) by staff counsel recommending dismissal.
The Supreme Court can perhaps prod the N LRB to take some remedial
measures in this area, although it may find inadequate legislative warrant for
doing so. No such reticence need affect the Administrative Conference or the
Section of Labor Relations Law of the American Bar Association. Indeed,
since the NLRB could readily embody any proposals coming from such
sources in its own rules, it is apparent that it need not even await action or
study by public or private groups, for the Board's rulemaking procedures
provide a fully adequate basis for bringing informed opinion to bear on the
question.
67. See Justice Harlan's expression of similar difficulty, 403 U.S. at 290 n.6 ; cf. id.
at 288-89 n . S .
68. There i s a strong argument that the limitations bar to federal unfair-labor-practice
charges should preclude resort to a state-created right of action as well, since Congress'
purpose in p rescribing a short period in which a charge could be filed was to give sub
stantial weight to the interest in stability. See Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 4 1 1
( 1960) ; cf. text accompanying notes 3 1-37 supra. A passage in Garm on, to the effect
that state law remains p reempted despite inability to obtain federal relief when the dis
missal of a Board charge lacks "unclouded legal significance," 359 U.S. at 246, may be
read to support this result, albeit on primary-jurisdiction grounds.
69. As Justice Douglas pointed out, dissenting in Lockridge, the Supreme Court has
never squarely passed on the unreviewability rule, and the reaffirmation of Garmon may
lead to a break in that position. See 403 U.S. at 305 n.2.
70. As, for example, in the dispute out of which L o ckridge arose. See text accompany
ing note 16 supra.

484
C.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

The Future of Lockridge

Lockridge asked whether Gannon still lived ; we must ask now whether
Lockridge will survive. Justice Harlan closed his opinion in that case with
these compellingly pertinent thoughts:
While we do not assert that the Garmon doctrine is without imper
fection, we do think that it is founded on reasoned principle and that
until it is altered by congressional action or by judicial insights that
are born of further experience with it, a heavy burden rests upon
those who would, at this late date, ask this Court to abandon Garmon
and set out again in quest of a system more nearly perfect. A fair
regard for considerations of stare decisis and the coordinate role of
the Congress in defining the extent to which federal legislation pre
empts state law strongly supports our conclusion that the basic tenets
of Gannon should not be disturbed.7 1
As I write these words, the author of those I have quoted lies near
death,72 and another of the 5-man Lockridge majority is already gone. Justice
Harlan's admonition was not merely the marshalling of a debater's point.
He wrote for the minority in Garmon, and became the chief expositor of its
rationale, restating its underpinnings in far more tenable fashion than did
its author. His words, and his career, remind us how debased is much of the
recent talk about "judicial conservatism" and "strict construction."
Service on the Supreme Court gives a man or woman a unique oppor
tunity to discover his true perception of this country, and of the Court's role
in its evolution; one hopes that those who follow Justice Harlan will find
in his concepts of the judicial function a more enduring guide than thoughts
spoken into the political winds would suggest. On the realization of that hope
depends far more than the future of the preemption doctrine.
7 1 . 403 U.S.at 302.
72. Justice Harlan died on December 30, 1 971.

